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CHAPTER I 
THE BASIC DEFINITIONS OF THE LEGAL TERMS 
RELATING TO THE PRIEST-PENITENT PRIVILEGE 
In everyday discourse the terms "communication," 
"confidence," and "privilege" are defined in a more gen-
eral sense than in a court of law. It becomes necessary, 
therefore, to define these terms more closely for the pre-
sent study. Henry Campbell Black in his well-known legal 
dictionary, Black's Law Dictionary, defines the term "com-
munication" in the following manner: 
Information given, the sharing of knowledge by one with 
another; conference; consultation or bargaining pre-
paratory to making a contract. A communication can be 
either absolutely privileged or conditionally or qual-
ifiedly privileged.' 
Perhaps a more complete definition is found in volume fifteen 
of Corpus Juris Secundum: 
...the act of communicating. The term also means in-
telligence, news, that which is communicated or imparted, 
a written or verbal message, something said by one person 
to another. It is not restricted, however, to mere words, 
but includes acts as well, embracing every variety of af-
fairs which can form the subject of negotiation, inter-
views, or actions between two persons, and every method 
by which one person can derive impressions or information 
from the conduct, condition, or language of another.2  
These definitions emphasize the legal aspect of the term. 
"Communication" refers not only to words spoken between two 
persons but also to the conduct, condition, and language of 
a person. The term can also refer to written materials. 
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The legal sense of the term "privilege" goes beyond 
the ordinary meaning and has a variety of meanings under the 
law. Basically, the term refers to "a right, power, fran-
chise, or immunity held by a person or class, against or 
beyond the course of the law."3 In this sense the parish 
pastor in certain limited circumstances has the right or 
immunity in a court of law not to testify to matters which 
he has discussed with a person who has come to him for spir-
itual help. The "privilege" or right is described in vol-
ume fifteen of Corpus Juris Secundum in the following manner: 
Certain classes of communications, passing between per-
sons who stand in a confidential or fiduciary relation-
to each other (or who, on account of their relative sit-
uation, are under a duty of secrecy or fidelity), which 
the law will not permit to be divulged, or allow them to 
be inquired into in a court of justice, for the sake of 
public policy and the good order of society. The phrase 
describes only secret communications, the secrecy being 
enjoined either actually or by implication, and so does 
not include communications made for the purpose, or with 
the expectation, of being disclosed, or those made in 
the presence of others.4 
The third term frequently referred to in relation to the 
penitent-priest privilege is "confidence." The legal sense 
of this term is more closely aligned with the definition af-
forded it in normal discourse. Black offered this definition 
of the term: 
Trust; reliance; ground of trust. It is as applicable 
to the subject of trust, as nearly a synonym, as the 
English language is capable of. Trust is a confidence 
which one man reposes in another and confidence is a 
trust.5 
Often the terms "communication" and "privilege" are used 
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in connection with one another in a legal sense and in this 
present study. The term 'privileged communication" is de-
fined with some degree of precision in volume fifteen of 
Corpus Juris Secundum: 
A communication communicated in confidence, privately 
indorsed, secret, in reliance on secrecy....The term is 
employed in the law with two significations. In one 
sense it signifies oral or printed utterances which are 
not actionable although defamatory, and in this sense 
the term is treated in Libel and Slander paragraphs 67-
120. In another sense the term "privileged communica-
tion" has reference to communications made during the 
existence of certain confidential relationships recog-
nized by law and not competent to be produced in court 
during the trial of a case.6  
The basic meaning of "privileged communications" in this 
study is information obtained during the course of counsel-
ing which a minister does with one who has sought his spir-
itual guidance. This information is legally exempt as evi-
dence in a court of law under certain circumstances which 
shall be taken up at the proper point in this study. 
CHAPTER II 
A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Clergymen have traditionally been reluctant to divulge 
information which they have received during the course of 
spiritual guidance to individuals. Ministers have been 
known to pay a fine and go to jail before revealing the con-
tents of communications between them and their counselees. 
The confidential information received by the clergyman has 
been considered both professionally and ethically to be a 
sacred trust. Wayne E. Oates refers to this covenant re-
lationship in his book on pastoral counseling, Protestant  
Pastoral Counseling: 
A covenant of communication is much more than a promise 
not to tell anything the person has said, which may or 
may not be a wise thing to promise. A covenant of com-
munication consists of a mutual understanding that both 
the counselor and the couiggrjg will consult with each 
other before either of them discusses their conversation 
with anyone else. Thus, no one is told what has been 
discussed without the permission of the other to do so.' 
Although the confidential relationship which a lawyer 
enjoys with his client and which a doctor has with his pa-
tient has been safeguarded under the law to great lengths, 
the relationship which the parish pastor has with his spir-
itual guardians has not fared well at all under the law. 
Presently fourty-four states have statutes concerning the 
"priest-penitent Privilege" as it is commonly termed.8 This 
does not mean that in every case where a clergyman has claimed 
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the privilege in those forty-four states that it has been 
granted. William Harold Tiemann refers to this fact in his 
book, The Right to Silence: 
The fact that a state has a statute on the priest-
penitent privilege, however, does not guarentee that 
a minister may be excluded from testifying as a witness 
in a trial. In nearly all of the cases in which the 
statute has been invoked, the courts have recognized 
the rule, but have found that under the particular cir-
cumstances of the case it was not applicable.9 
Under these circumstances the minister is confronted with a 
serious ethical and professional problem. If he reveals 
confidential information received during a counseling ses-
sion he is neglecting his responsibilities toward those whom 
he counsels. If he refuses to testify in a court of law he 
runs the risk of fine and/or jail. In addition, the pastor 
must have the complete trust and confidence of those whom he 
counsels before any meaningful counseling can occur. The 
justiceis opinion in the LeGore v. LeGore case pertains: 
Any intermediary in a marital dispute must have the 
confidence of both parties and must know the true 
facts if he is to give effective guidance and counsel-
ing. Nothing could be more destructive of the trust 
and confidence that the parties would place in him, 
than the apprehension that he might later divulge what 
was told to him in confidence. Marriage counseling 
seeking to preserve the sanctity of marriage is most 
important and is definitely within the functions and 
duties of a minister. It is to be encouraged rather 
than discouraged.10  
Thus it behooves the minister to be well acquainted 
with his legal rights in this area of counseling so that 
(211'\ he may more effectively minister to those who seek his guid- 
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ance. This study is an effort to inform the parish pastor 
of his rights in this area. It is written from the view-
point and knowledge of a layman and is not an attempt to 
present legal advice in any particular situation which might 
occur during a pastor's functions as a counselor. It is 
merely an attempt to lay the facts before him and hopefully 
enable a more enlightened approach to the possible legal 
pitfalls of the counseling situation. In every case where 
there is a legal question involved the pastor should con-
sult an attorney. 
The scope of this paper is twofold. First there is a 
brief history of the "priest-penitent privilege" under com-
mon law. Secondly there is a review of the privilege in the 
fifty states and under the Federal jurisdictions. The num-
ber of cases and statutes concerning this privilege are too 
numerous to be dealt with at length. Only representative 
cases and landmark decisions are reviewed. The statutes 
pertaining to the priest-penitent privilege are listed in 
the Appendix of this paper. No attempt has been made to 
analyze each statute, but there is an analysis of their con-
tent along the lines of narrow versus broadened statutes. 
This has reference to whether a statute gives minimal pro-
tection to the minister or whether it provides more exten-
sive coverage in this priest-penitent relationship. 
Two important previous investigations into this problem 
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should be mentioned. Fred L. Kuhlmannts article, "Communica-
tions to Clergymen--When Are They Privileged?" in the Spring, 
1968, Valparaiso University Law Review1, is an excellent over-
view of the problem from the viewpoint of a lawyer. The sec-
ond major source is a book by Harold William Tiemann entitled, 
The Right To Silence.12  Tiemann holds Bachelor of Divinity 
and Master of Theology degrees from Austin Presbyterian 
Theological Seminary and has down extenxive work in the area 
from a minister's viewpoint. 
CHAPTER III 
THE PRIVILEGE UNDER COMMON LAW 
A brief history of the priest-penitent privilege is in 
order for a proper understanding of the status of the privi-
lege in the courts of the United States today. During the 
Middle Ages the priest-penitent privilege was not recognized 
in the courts of England under what is termed common law. 
Henry Campbell Black defines "common law" in his legal dic-
tionary, Black's Law Dictionary. 
...the common law is that body of law and juristic the-
ory which was originated, developed, and formulated and 
is administered in England, and has obtained among most 
of the states and peoples of Anglo-Saxon stock. As dis-
tinguished from law created by the enactment of legis-
latures, the common law comprises the body of those prin-
ciples and rules of action, relating to the government 
and security of persons and property, which derive their 
authority solely from usages and customs of immemorial 
antiquity, or from the judgements and decrees of the 
courts recognizing, affirming, and enforcing such usages 
and customs; and, in this sense, particularly the ancient 
unwritten law of England As concerns its force and 
authority in the United States, the phrase designates 
that portion of the common law of England...which had 
been adopted and was in force here at the time of the 
Revolution. This, so far as it has not since been ex-
pressly abrogated, is recognized as an organic part of 
the jurisprudence of most of the United States.13 
Basically common law is that body of law which is unwritten 
by a state legislature but is a common rule of practice which 
is followed in a court of law when there is no statute which 
takes precedent. 
Reference is also made to "statute." Black defines the 
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term in the following manner: 
An Act of the legislature declaring, commanding, or 
prohibiting something; a particular law enacted and 
established by the will of the legislative department 
of government; the written will of the legislature, 
solemnly expressed according to the forms necessary to 
constitute it the law of the state....This word is used 
to designate the written law in contradistinction to 
the unwritten law.14 
The common law history of the priest-penitent privilege 
is one of almost constant rejection. Clergy were repeatedly 
compelled to testify in the courts of England or face the 
consequences, namely, contempt of court. Most authorities 
agree that after the Restoration in England the privilege 
did not exist under common law. The justice in a North 
Carolina case, In re Williams, held a Baptist minister in 
contempt of court for refusing to testify in a rape case and 
made the following comment in his opinion on the case: 
Apart from the statute, there is no privilege with ref-
erence to communications between clergyman, or other 
spiritual advisor, and his colamunicants or other who 
seek his advice and camfort.1,  
Tiemann in his book, The Right to Silence, states: "The 
commentators on the laws of evidence generally agree that 
after the Restoration, the common law recognized no right 
of privileged communications to clergymen."16 In another 
place Tiemann states: "Under the common law, only two re-
lations were recognized as privileged--those between at-
torney and client and those between husband and wife."17  
Fred L. Kuhlmann concurs in this opinion with the following 
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comment: 
This statement coincides with the views of authorities 
on the law of evidence and two New Jersey cases which 
made clear that in the absence of a statute granting the 
privilege the testimony of a clergyman can be compelled 
under the common law. Moreover, there is considerablg 
dicta to this effect in other state court decisions.10  
The existence of the priest-penitent privilege before the 
Restoration in England is attested by Edward A. Hogan in his 
"A Modern rroblem on the Privilege of the Confessional" which 
appears in the Loyola Law Review. 
Through blind acceptance of Lord Coke,s gloss on the 
statute of Articuli Cleri, American lawyers have failed 
to discover the true nature of the privilege. The omis-
sion in Blackstoneis Commentaries which has often been 
given great weight by the American bench and bar from 
our earliest day, has led to calm acceptance of the prop-
osition that no such privilege was known to common law. 
More likely the privilege existed at early common law, 
but subsequently was banned with the banning of the 
Prayer Book of the Church of England.19  
The importance of these comments is the fact that in 
the absence of a statute the common law obtains. Since the 
concensus is that the common law did not recognize the priest-
penitent privilege, the result is that where there is no 
statute recognizing the priest-penitent privilege the courts 
have not recognized the privilege under common law. There 
have been minor exceptions to this rule as we shall see. 
A brief review of the major cases that have been decided 
under common law is appropiate at this point. The cases re-
emphasize the point that the common law did not recognize the 
priest-penitent privilege. The cases are arranged in chrono- 
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logical order to show the progression of thought in the 
courts concerning the priest-penitent privilege. 
The earliest on record case under the common law is 
simply known as Anonymous (1693, England).20 Only one 
phrase in Lord Chief Justice Holt.s opinion obtains. 
Lord Chief Justice Holt declared that communications 
with an attorney or scrivener were privileged; "for 
he is counsel to a man with whom he will advise, if 
he be intrusted and educated in such way of practice; 
otherwise, of a gentleman, parson, etc." The mean-
ing of the last ambiguous phrase is that the privi-
lege would not apply to a pastor.21  
In 1802 an Irish court decided the case of Butler v.  
Moore.22 A Roman Catholic priest was called to testify to 
the deceased final religious affliation. The heir of Lord 
Bunboyne had attempted to prove that his ancestor who had 
been a Catholic, joined the Anglican Church and later re-
turned to the Catholic Church. If this could be proved 
Lord Bunboyne was incapable of making a will to divide his 
property. The heir would receive a larger share of the 
estate than was provided in the will. When the priest was 
called to testify he refused to testify on the grounds of 
"confidential communications made to him in the exercise of 
his clerical functions."23 Mr. Justice Smith ruled that the 
privilege did not exist under common law and found the priest 
in contempt of court. The priest was jailed.24  
People v. Phillips25  was a New York case decided in 1013. 
This case is of particular interest because it is one instance 
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in which the court decided that a priest had the privilege 
in the absence of a statute. Unfortunately the courts have 
not followed this case and it is the only one on record 
under state law in which the privilege was granted in the 
absence of a statute.26 
Another New York case decided in 1017 is simply entitled 
Christian Smith's Case.27 In this murder case the Reverend 
Peter J. Van Pelt, a Protestant minister, was called to test-
ify concerning statements made to him as a minister of the 
gospel. The defense counsel objected to the testimony but 
Justice Van Ness ruled that the confession was not privileged. 
He stated: 
...there is a grave distinction, between auricular con-
fessions made to a priest in the course of discipline, 
according to the cannons of the church, and those made 
to a minister of the gospel in confidence, merely as a 
friend or adviser.28  
The significance of this case is that it is the first case on 
record in this country of an actual distinction being made 
between the confessional of the Roman Catholi,. Church and 
those communications made to Protestant ministers during the 
course of their functions as a spiritual adviser.29 
The Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Drake30  de-
cided in 1818 did not consider penitential confessions to 
fellow members of a church to be privileged information. 
The charge was lewdness and involved a public confession 
before a congregation. Tiemann reports that so far as he 
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can determine no court has ever ruled that a public confes-
sion before a congregation is a privileged communication.31 
In 1853 the common law case of Regina v. Griffin32  
a chaplain of a workhouse was allowed not to testify in a 
criminal case. However the fact that the chaplain did not 
testify was more the result of the prosecution:s withdrawal 
of its request for the chaplainls testimony than it was the 
result of the judge's decision in the case. Although the 
judge did state: "I do not lay this down as an absolute 
rule; but I think that such evidence ought not to be given."33 
It was on the basis of this statement that the prosecution 
did not press for the testimony of the chaplain. 
Regina v. Hu314- granted no privilege to a Catholic 
priest who refused to testify as to who gave him a watch 
which was charged as being stolen. The case was decided in 
1860 in England. It is significant because it reveals how 
difficult it is to determine the scope of the priest-penitent 
privilege. A criminal came to a priest and handed over a 
watch which he had stolen. He did this in the confessional. 
Tiemann reveals the important point in this case. 
Surely, the handing over of the watch by the thief to 
the priest was as much an act of privileged communica-
tion as any penitential words spoken. By it, guilt was 
acknowledged and confessed. At the same time we find 
here an implied recognition that the confession itself 
was a privileged communication.35 
The judge in the case did not agree with the point of view 
which Tiemann suggests. The justice made the following 
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comment on the case. 
...that statements made to a priest or clergyman in 
sacramental or quasis sacramental confession are priv-
ileged, but anything said or done out of confession is 
not so, even although its disclosure may incidentally 
disclose the identity of the party.36  
In a divorce case for the cause of adultery the English 
court granted no privilege to the vicar of a church who had 
heard certain admissions from the accused. In this 1893 
case of Normanshaw v. Normanshaw37  the president of the 
court summed up his opinion in the following words: 
...each case of confidential communication should be 
dealt with on its own merits, but ...it was not to be 
supposed for a single moment that a clergyman had §ny 
right to withold information from a court of law.3' 
Cook v. Carrol (1945, Ireland)39 is an important modern 
case under common law. This case will be dealt with at 
length when we discuss the matter of who possesses the priv-
ilege. For the present it is sufficient to relate the back-
ground of the case and the pertinent assessment of Justice 
Cavan Duff. The background is that a parish priest was cal-
led to testify in a seduction case. The priest refused on 
the grounds of "confidential communication." Tiemann re-
lates the opinion of the court in his own words. 
In this case the Irish court pointed out that since the 
privilege was not recognized under the common law of 
England, the priest in England could be sentenced for 
refusing to co-operate with the court. But the judge 
went on to say that the common law of England is the 
common law of Ireland only to the extent that the 
English common law is not contrary to the national 
independence and the public policy of Ireland. The 
court then declared that the denial of privilege of the 
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confessional was a heresy which developed in the post-
Reformation period and was contrary to the public policy 
of Ireland. The priest was not held in contempt for re-
fusing to testify.40  
Also the comments of Justice Gavan Duff himself are pertinent. 
The issue here is governed by common law, not by any 
Act of Parliament, and, while common law in Ireland and 
England may generally coincide, it is now recognized that 
they are not necessarily the same; in particular, the 
customs and public opinion of the two countries diverge 
on matters touching religion, and the common law in force 
must harmonise with our Constitution.41  
These cases under common law provide an important in-
sight into the decisions in the courts today. Where a state 
does not have a statute or where the statute is unclear in 
its designations the courts in the United States today have 
followed the common law rule of not recognizing the priest-
penitent privilege. Tiemann states: 
We may conclude that on the whole, privileged communi-
cation between priest and penitent has not fared well 
under the common law. While there are exceptions, such 
a privilege has not generally been recognized by the 
courts. If our concern is genuine in this cause to 
protect the penitential confidences between priest and 
penitent, whatever his faith, then we must work to es-
tablish protection under statute law.42  
With this comment in mind it is appropriate to review at this 
point what the various state statutes and jurisdictions have 
provided in the way of protection for the parish pastor from 
possible prosectuion for refusing to testify to confidential 
communications. The study of the priest-penitent privilege 
or clergyman-privilege under the various state statutes and 
jurisdictions will reveal how the courts have followed or not 
16 
followed the common law of England and the United States. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE PRIVILEGE UNDER THE VARIOUS 
STATE STATUTES AND JURISDICTIONS 
The study of the priest-penitent privilege under the 
various state statutes and jurisdictions will take the fol-
lowing format. First there is a discussion of the more im-
portant state statutes and their various implications. In-
cluded here is a discussion of the "construction" of the 
statutes in the various jurisdictions of the United states. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines the legal term, "construction," 
in the following passage: 
The process, or the art, of determining the sense, real 
meaning, or proper explanation of obscure or ambiguous 
terms or provisions in a statute, written instrument, 
or oral agreement, or the application of such subject 
to the case in question, by reasoning in the light de-
rived from extraneously connected circumstances or laws 
or writings bearing upon the same or a connected matter, 
or by seeking and applying the probable aim and purpose 
of the provision.43 
Black furthermore delineates between "strict construction" 
and liberal construction": 
Strict (or literal) construction is construction of a 
statute or other instrument according to its letter, 
which recognizes nothing that is not expressed, takes 
the language used in its exact and technical meaning, 
and admits no equitable considerations or implications. 
Liberal (or equitable) construction, on the other hand, 
expands the meaning of the statute to meet cases which 
are clearly within the spirit or reason of the law, or 
within the evil which it was designated to remedy, pro-
vided such an interpretation is not inconsistent with 
the language used; it resolves all reasonable doubts in 
favor of the applicability of the statute to the par- 
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ticular case. Black, Interp. Laws, 262; Causey v. 
Guilford County, 192 N.C. 298, 135 S.E. 40, 46. It 
means, not that the words should be forced out of their 
natural meaning, but simply that they should receive a 
fair and reasonable interpretation with respect to the 
objects and purposes of the instrumepp. Lawrence v. 
McCalmont 2 How. 426, 11 L.Ed. 326. 44 
The second portion of this chapter is devoted to a discussion 
of the basic conditions under which the priest-penitent priv-
ilege has been recognized in the United States in recent his-
tory. This portion is based on a study of the important 
cases which have been decided with reference to the various 
state statutes. 
Although forty-four states and the District of Columbia 
have statutes which recognize the priest-penitent privilege, 
none of them really protect the clergyman to the full extent 
which he deserves. In six states there is no statute and it 
is presumed that in the absence of a state statute the com-
mon law rule of no privilege obtains. Kuhlmann listed the 
six states which have no priest-penitent privilege. They 
are Alabama, Connecticut, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Texas, 
and West Virginia.45  
The states which do have statutes pertaining to the 
privileged nature of communications to clergymen can be di-
vided between those states which have a narrow definition 
of the privilege and those which have a broadened definition. 
Kuhlmann states that the following states have a broadened 
statute concerning the priest-penitent privilege: 
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California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, 
Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia.46  
The remaining states have statutes which could be defined 
as "narrow" in their interpretation of the privilege. These 
states are listed by Kuhlmann as follows: 
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, 
Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South 
Dakota, ptah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming. L+? 
The reader is referred to the Appendix of this paper for a 
verification of this data. 
Of the states which have a narrow statute there are 
certain characteristics which might be listed. A survey of 
the Appendix of this paper which contains a complete listing 
of the state statutes will reveal that those states which 
have been listed as having a narrow statute use key phrases. 
These key phrases are the following: "minister of the gospel, 
or priest," "confessions," "in his professional character or 
capacity," "in the course of discipline of his church." The 
wording of these narrow statutes is so similar because they 
have all been based on the first clergyman-privilege statute 
to be enacted in the United States. This statute was passed 
in 1926 by the New York state legislature and consisted of 
the following single sentence: 
No minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomina-
tion whatsoever, shall be allowed to disclose any con- 
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fessions made to him in his professional character, in 
the course of discipline enjoined by the rules of prac-
tice of such denomination.40  
The key phrases found in this statute and reproduced in the 
various state statutes which have a narrow privilege can be 
construed in a variety of ways and have been in the various 
state jurisdictions. The ambiguity of these terms argues 
for more explicit statutes in these states. 
The cases involving the narrow statutes are numerous. 
Only in rare instances has a court bothered to deter-
mine whether the law requires a strict or a liberal 
construction of privileged statutes, and the courts 
which have expressly addressed themselves to this ques-
tion have disagreed.49 
Of those courts which have addressed themselves to the nar-
row statutes In re Swenson50 is the landmark case and has 
been considered the clergyman's "bible" in those states which 
have only a narrow definition of the priest-penitent privi-
lege. This case was decided in 1931 before Minnesota broad-
ened its statute. It is based on the 1927 Minnesota statute 
which reads as follows: 
A clergyman or other minister of any religion shall not, 
without the consent of the party making the confession, 
be allowed to disclose a confession made to him in his 
professional character, in the course of discipline en-
joined by the rules or practice of the religious body 
to which he belongs.51  
As we shall see the Minnesota Supreme Court construed this 
statute liberally. Kuhlmann believes that the Swenson deci-
sion was questionable in its logic and conclusion.52 
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The circumstances of the In re Swenson case are as fol-
lows. A Lutheran minister in Minneapolis had performed the 
marriage ceremony for the Sundseth's and both had been mem-
bers of his church. Mr. Sunseth was the trustee of the 
church. He telephoned the pastor and asked for permission 
to see him. The request was granted and he came immediately 
to the pastor=s office. There he related to his pastor the 
intimate affairs which were the cause for his wife's civorce 
action against him.53  
Of importance in the courts decision to uphold the priv-
ilege and not allow the Lutheran pastor to testify was the 
statement by the court that a voluntary confession qualifies 
for the privilege in the same manner as one made under the 
"course of discipline" of a church such as the Raman Catholic 
Church which makes confession a sacrament and requires it.54  
The justice states the following opinion: 
...The question is not the truth or merits of the reli-
gious persuasion to which a party belongs nor whether 
the particular creed or denomination exacts, requires, 
or permits a sacred communication, but the sole question 
is, as suggested in Best on Ev. (12th Ed.) Sec. 585, 
whether the party who bona fide seeks spiritual advice 
should be allowed it freely.5 
Here the Minnesota court construed the words "in the course 
of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of the re-
ligious body to which he belongs"56 to mean not only confes-
sions made to Roman Catholic priests or others to whom con-
fessions are required by their church but also those confes- 
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sions which are voluntarily given and received. 
Only four other cases uphold the priest-penitent priv-
ilege under narrow state statutes. They are Krugilov v.  
KrugilovF Kohloff v. Bronx Savings Bank,58 Vickers v.  
Stoneman,59  and Dehler v. State ex rel Bierck.60 These 
cases are of minor importance since they did not establish 
precedents. There is basically one importance in these cases. 
They did uphold the clergyman-privilege in states which have 
the narrow type of statute. These five cases do not offer 
much encouragement to the clergymen who live in the twenty-
three states which have the narrow statutes. Kuhlmann con-
siders this "...not the sort of judicial record to give en-
couragement to clergymen living in the twenty-three states 
which have these archaic statutes, especially when there are 
numerous cases decided under these statutes in which the 
clergyman was permitted or compelled to testify.61 
Several cases of major importance can be mentioned which 
were decided under the narrow statutes and which construed 
the statutes more strictly than was the case in the Swenson 
trial. Knight v. Lee62  declared that the confessions to an 
elder and a deacon of the Disciples of Christ Church are not 
valid as privileged information. The term "clergyman" does 
not mean an elder or a deacon. In Alford v. Johnson63  con-
versations with a Methodist minister were not held by the 
Arkansas court to be made "in the course of discipline en- 
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joined by the rules of practice of the Methodist churdh."64  
In Johnson v. Commonwealth65  a minister of the Methodist 
church had voluntarily visited an accused murder in jail. 
The defendant, in the course of his conversation with the 
pastor stated that he had lost his temper and killed the 
deceased. Judge Rees of the Kentucky Court of Appeals 
ruled that the conversation and resultant information was 
not privileged because the conversation was not penitential 
in character. Judge Rees made the following opinion: 
It does not appear that the conversation between the 
minister and appellant, during which the statement was 
made, was connected in any way with the discipline of 
the church. The statement was made in the same manner 
it would have been made to any other visitor. The visit 
of Mr. Dixon (Rev. J.L. Dixon) to the jail where the 
appellant was incarcerated was voluntary on his part and 
unsolicited. There is nothing in the record to indicate 
that the appellant belonged to the Methodist Church or 
any other denomination or that he made the statement in 
question of some supposed religious duty. 66 
Here the Kentucky court construed the state statute in strict 
terms. Finally, there is the case of Simrin v. Simrin67 in 
the state of California. This case was decided in 1965 in 
the same year in which California broadened its clergyman-
privilege. The Simrin case was decided before the statute 
in California was broadened. The case involved a rabbi who 
engaged in marriage counseling with a couple who later di-
vorced. In the divorce proceeding the rabbi was called to 
testify. The judge in the case ruled that the rabbi was not 
privileged in this instance because the California statute 
2  
did not apply to communications made to a marriage counselor. 
There was no binding spiritual confession involved. Later 
in the year the California statute was broadened to include 
marriage counseling. The justice in the Simrin case offered 
this comment: 
It would wrench the language of the statute to hold that 
it applies to communications made to a religious or spir-
itual advisor acting as a marriage counselor. We think 
this result regrettable for reasons of public policy... 
but the wording of the statute leaves us no choice.bd 
These cases are just a sampling of the numerous decisions 
under the narrow state statutes which have been construed 
strictly. 
In recent years states have broadened the clergyman-
privilege. Kuhlmann comments on this fact. 
Fifteen states in the past decade have either enacted 
statutes for the first time or have liberalized stat-
utes which had been on their books. Clergyman-privilege 
has become a part of the law of evidence.bV 
The states which have been listed as having the broadened 
privilege display certain characteristics. The statutes 
go beyond the simple term "confession" and use words such 
as "communications," "information," "confidential commun-
ications," "disclosure," or "confidence." These statutes 
often make it clear that the course of discipline of a min-
ister includes his functions and duties as a minister and 
not merely or simply the hearing of a confession.70 The 
broadened statutes often include: (1) more explicit de-
finitions of the term "clergyman"; (2) the inclusion of 
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quasi-legal proceedings as qualified situations where the 
privilege may be claimed; 72 (3) provisions for fines in the 
event a clergyman should divulge confidential information in 
a court of law;73 (4) provision for marriage counseling as 
a bona fide course of discipline of the minister."' 
Several specific state statutes are of interest. The 
Florida statute broadened the concept of the minister's 
duties as a counselor. The statute provides that a minister 
will not be allowed or required to testify to confidential 
communications 
...properly entrusted to him in his professional cap-
acity, and necessary to enable him to discharge the 
functions of his office according to the usual course 
of his practice or discipline.75 
Blaes comments on this broadened concept. 
The Florida statute sets up a standard for communica-
tions to the minister "according to the usual course 
of his practice or discipline." It seems that the 
standard of the minister's own "practice" is a much 
broader concept than that of the discipline of a church.76 
The Kansas statute is one that also deserves our at-
tention. The Kansas statute broadens the concept of the 
minister's discipline or obligation to include one who is 
authorized 
to administer the rites and ceremonies thereof 
in public worship, and who as his regular and cus-
tomary vocation preaches and teaches the principles 
of religion and administers the ordinances of public 
worship as embodied in the creed or principles of 
such church, sect, or organization.7( 
Thus not only confessions are admissible as privileged in- 
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formation, but also information received in the minister's 
course of duty as one who "preaches and teaches the prin- 
ciples of religion and administers the ordinances of public 
worship as embodied in the creed or principles of such church."78 
Blaes relates that the Uniform Rules of Evidence79 do not 
contain this broadened concept. 
The Uniform Rules of Evidence as drafted by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, from 
which the entire Article Four of our New Code of Civil 
Procedure was copied almost verbatim, do not contain 
this broadened concept. The proposed Uniform Rule 
Twenty-nine adheres tooIhe condition of a church dis-
ciplinary requirement.uu 
The California statute found in Deering's California 
Codes81 is of interest because of its rather precise defin-
ition of terms. The terms "clergyman" and "penitential 
communication" are explicitly defined. In addition the 
clergyman has possession of the privilege as well as the 
penitent. Thus the clergyman can prevent the penitent from 
testifying in court to confidential information he has re-
ceived from the penitent. The Law Revision Commission 
Comment as found in Deering's, California Codes, made this 
assessment. 
This section provides the clergyman with a privilege 
in his own right. Moreover, he may claim this priv-
ilege even if the penitent has waived the privilege 
granted him by Section 1033. 63 
The Georgia statute uses the terms "every communica- 
tion" and "by any person professing religious faith." These 
terms leave considerable room for a liberal construction of 
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the statute and favors the granting of the privilege for the 
clergyman. The statute reads as follows: 
Every communication made by any person professing re-
ligious faith, or seeking spiritual comfort, to any 
Protestant minister of the Gospel, or to any priest of 
the Roman Catholic faith, or to any Christian or Jewish 
minister, by whatever name called, shall be deemed priv-
ileged. No such minister, priest or rabbi shall dis-
close any communications made to him by any such person 
professing religious faith, or seeking spiritual guid-
ance, or be competent or compellable to testify with 
reference to any such communication in any court.84 
In the states which have broadened their clergyman-
privilege two cases seem to stand out as being important in 
relation to the manner in which they construed these liberal 
or broadened statutes. These are LeGore v. LeGore65  and 
In re Williams.86 LeGore v. LeGore construed the Pennsylvania 
statute liberally. The In re Williams case in North Carolina 
was construed strictly. 
In LeGore v. LeGore the justice in the Appelate court 
ruled that the lower trial court had wrongfully admitted 
testimony of a clergyman in a divorce proceeding. The jus-
tice liberally construed the words in the Pennsylvania stat-
ute which follows. 
No clergyman, priest, rabbi or minister of the gospel 
of any regularly established church or religious organ-
ization, except clergymen or ministers, who are self-
ordained or who are members of religious organizations 
in which members other than the leader thereof are 
deemed clergymen or ministers, who while in the course 
of his duties has acquired information from any person 
secretly and in confidence shall lore compelled, or al-
lowed without consent of such person, to disclose that 
information in any legal proceeding, trial or investi-
gation before any grand jury, traverse or petit jury, 
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or any officer thereof, before the General Assembly or 
any committee thereof or before any commission, depart-
ment or bureau of this Commonwealth, or municipal body, 
officer or committee thereof.87 (Italics mine) 
Here communications to clergymen in marriage counseling were 
considered privileged. The appropiate part of the judge's 
opinion in this case is found on page five of this paper and 
footnote number ten relates the source of this opinion. 
In re Williams was a strict construction of a liberal 
or broadened statute in North Carolina. A Baptist minister 
refused to testify in a rape case on the grounds that it 
would violate his duty as a Chrisitan minister and that he 
did not wish to take sides. Both the prosecution and the 
defence had no objection to the minister's testimony yet he 
persisted in his refusal to testify. The judge round him in 
contempt of court and sentenced him to ten days in jail. 
The judge strictly adhered to the state statute which pro-
vides that "this section shall not apply where communicant 
in open court waives the privilege conferred."6d 
It remains to be determined under what general condi-
tions the privilege has been granted in the jurisdictions of 
the United states today. Although the statutes vary con-
siderably, there are general conditions under which the 
clergyman-privilege and the clergyman's professional re-
lationships are recognized in most of the states. It must 
be remembered that the narrow statutes are less likely to 
allow the clergyman these rights and that the conditions 
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discussed in the following discourse may not apply in those 
jurisdictions which have the narrow statute. 
Kuhlmann suggests that there are four basic tests or 
requirements to be met before communications to clergymen 
will be recognized as privileged under the narrow statutes. 
1.  The communication must be made to a clergyman. 
2.  The communication must be a "confession." 
3.  The confession must be made to the clergyman in his 
professional character. 
L. The communication must have been made "in the course 
of discipline enjoined by the rules of practice" of the 
clergyman,s denomination. 89 
The terms "clergyman," "confession," "in his professional 
character," and "in the course of discipline enjoined by the 
rules of practice" have been construed strictly by most courts. 
Clergymen in those twenty-three states which have the narrow 
statute find that in the majority of the cases decided in 
their respective states the courts have not allowed the priv-
ilege. Tiemann states: 
The tendency of the courts is 
tion of those statutes making 
men privileged, and, usually, 
are privileged which are made 
enumerated in the statutes.90  
The first general requirement  
toward a strict construe-
communications to clergy-
only those communications 
under the exact conditions 
for the privilege is usu- 
ally that it be made to a "clergyman." Courts have ruled 
and a few statutes explicitly indicate91 that person who is 
self-ordained is not to be classified a clergyman and is not 
entitled to the privilege. Also courts have ruled that an 
elder of a church or a deacon does not qualify as a clergy- 
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man. There is one exception to this rule in the case of 
Reutkemeier v. Nolte92  in the Iowa Supreme Court (1917). 
The court 
...acknowledged that in the Presbyterian Church the 
Session stands in much the same disciplinary relation-
ship to the members of the congregation as the priest 
alone does in the Roman Catholic Church. Whether this 
ruling would apply to other denominations having or-
dained officers charged with the spiritual discipline 
of the congregation is not known. But the logic would 
seem to point that way.93 
The next requirement for the clergyman-privilege seems 
to be that the communication must be in the form of a con-
fession. This is not true in the more liberal state statutes 
which allow communications during marriage counseling to be 
classified as privileged. For instance see the statutes of 
California, Delaware, and the District of Columbia in the 
Appendix of this paper. Yet the majority of the statutes in 
the United States today require that the communications to 
the clergyman be "confessions." Some states are less strict 
as to the meaning of this term than other states. Many states 
require that the statements to the clergyman must be peniten-
tial in character. The person must be seeking spiritual con-
solation or forgiveness for sin. The Kansas statute requires 
that the person must believe in God. In Section Four it 
states: 
"penitent" means a person who recognized the existence 
and the authority of God and who seeks or recives from 
a regular or duly ordained minister of religion advice 
or assistance in determing or discharging his moral 
obligations, or in obtaining God's mercy or forgiveness 
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for past culpable conduct.94 
Other states and court rulings have determined that "con-
fessions" can mean voluntary penitential statements as op-
posed to those which are required by a church rule or dis-
cipline. Here the case of In re Swenson applies.95 
The third requirement is that the statements be made 
to the clergyman during his capacity as a clergyman and in 
his "professional character." In a case entitled, McGroganis  
Will96 the court ruled that a simple matter of a minister 
receiving two checks totalling $5000.00 coupled with a vol-
untary expression from the deceased to the effect that the 
church would get all of her money upon her death was not 
related in a spiritual advier relationship. The minister 
was not acting in his professional capacity as a spiritual 
adviser. In People v. Gates97  admissions to the president 
of a consistory of a church were not held to be made to the 
president in his professional character as a clergyman. It 
can be said that where the minister is acting solely as an 
agent for a person or advising him concerning matters out-
side the realm of spiritual guidance those statements may 
not be held to be privileged in a court of law. 
Statements by parishioners or others to a clergyman 
to the effect that another person has comitted a crime or 
statements that reveal information about another person are 
not held to be privileged. They are not penitential; they 
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do not confess sin but only reveal it. Yet it must be re-
membered that several states do cover these types of com-
munications also. As was mentioned, marriage counseling is 
one instance were non-penitential statements are covered in 
some states by the clergyman-privilege. The Delaware stat-
ute pertains here.98 
The fourth general requirement for the clergyman-
privilege is that it be made "in the course of discipline 
enjoined by the rules of practice" of a particular church or 
denomination. This implies that the statements to the clergy-
man must not only be a confession but they must be required  
by the church and its teachings. In most cases this would 
mean that only the Roman Catholic church would qualify, but 
most jurisdictions have broadened the concept so that other 
churches can claim the privilege. The Minnesota Supreme 
Court in the case of In re Swenson stated this broadened 
concept in the following terms: 
It is important that the communication be made in such 
a spirit and within the course of "discipline" and it 
is sufficient whether such "discipline" enjoins the 
clergyman to receive the comilnication or whether it 
enjoins the other party, if a member of the church, to 
deliver the communication. Such practice makes the 
communication privileged, when accompanies by the es-
sential characteristics, though made by a person not a 
member of the particular church or of any church. Man, 
regardless of his religious affliation, whose conscience 
is shrunken and whose soul is puny, enters the clergy-
manis door in despair and gloom; he there finds con-
solation and hope. It is said that God through the 
clergy resuscitates. The clergymen practise the thought 
that "the first of all altars is the soul of an unhappy 
man who is consoled and thanks God."99 
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Hare the confession of a man who is not a member of a church 
is regarded as privileged. Obviously a man who is not a mem-
ber of a church could not be under any discipline of the 
church to engage in confession since he does not belong to 
a church. Yet the clergyman may or may not be under such a 
discipline. Thus the traditional statute phrase that a con-
fession must be made "under the discipline of a church and 
its rules" is not explicit as to whethdr the "discipline en-
joined" refers to the fact that a given clergyman must hear 
confession under the rules of his church or whether a given 
parishoner must make confession. Either possibility could 
be meant by the indeterminant phrase "in the course of dis-
cipline enjoined by the church to which he belongs." Many 
of the broadened or newly enacted statutes have moved away 
from this type of phraseology. 
Wigmore in his treatise entitled, A Treatise on the  
Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law,100  
states that the following four requirements should be met 
in order that the clergyman-privilege might be granted: 
1. The communications must originate in a confidence 
that they will not be disclosed; 
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential 
to the full and satisfactory maintence of the relation 
between the parties; 
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of 
the community ought to be sedulously fostered; 
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the 
disclosure of the communication must be greater than 
the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal 
of litigation.101 
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These requirements are reflected in the foregoing discussion 
concerning Kuhlmann's four requirements which he has listed. 
Several particular situations remain to be discussed in 
relation to the pastors counseling situations. It might be 
asked: Are written materials considered to be confidential 
information under the clergyman-privilege? In Colbert v.  
State,102 a trial for arson, a priest of a village had re- 
ceived an anonymous letter confessing the crime of arson. 
The priest took the letter to the defendants residence and 
read it to her. He later testified in court that she was 
excited and wrote at his dictation and gave him a statement 
that no stranger spoke to her on the date of the fire, and 
that the letter was unknown to her. The priest testified 
in court that the handwriting of the original letter and that 
of the written statement were the same. The written state-
ments were admissible as evidence in the trial. 
In Allen v. Lindeman Kuhlmann reports that 
...the Iowa court compelled a clergyman to produce cer-
tain letters as evidence in an alienation of affection 
suit. The letters had been found by the defendant's 
wife in the defendant's home and had been delivered by 
her to her pastor for safekeeping. The court said it 
was dealing with an independent document and not a direct 
communication, and that if such evidence were to be ex-
cluded, justice could be thwarted simply by delivering 
important papers to a clergyman.103 
Kuhlmann also reports that in the case where a rector re-
ceived written statements from a man charged with bigamy the 
statements were not privileged. In the Hills v. State104 
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case the defendant had written out points he wanted the rec-
tor to bring before his wife.105 
It appears that written statements are not exempt from 
disclosure in a court of law. The clergyman is best suited 
in a counseling situation if he does not make any written 
account of the discussion and if he does not accept written 
materials from those whom he counsels. Joslin makes a good 
point along these lines in the following statement: 
In most cases, it is also very important that these 
innermost secrets communicated to the minister not be 
recorded in writing by the minister, nor any memorandum 
made which would divulge the confidence. They should 
be retained only in the memory of the minister.106  
Another point to consider is whether the clergyman-
privilege remains in effect when a third party has over-
heard the confidence whether planned or not. Tiemann gives 
his viewpoint in these words: 
The courts have generally held that when a privileged 
communication is overheard, whether by accident or 
design, by some person not a member of the privileged 
relation or a necessary intermediary, such a person 
may testify as to the communication. In fact, he is 
said to be absolutely unaffected by the rule of priv-
ilege.107 
There seems to be no precedent upon which Tiemannis opinion 
can be based. But in the absence of a court ruling on this 
matter it is best to concur with Tiemann that the person who 
overhears a privileged communication can and may be compelled 
to testify in a court of law. 
The question arises as to whether the observations which 
36 
the clergyman makes during the course of his counseling duties 
is privileged information. For instance, can the minister 
be compelled in a court of aiw to testify as to the physical 
or mental condition of his counselee? Evidently he can and 
may be compelled to testify. In Boyles v. Cora (Iowa, 1942) 
a clergyman was compelled to testify concerning observations 
he made in a counseling situation.lo8 The case of Buuck v.  
Kruckenberg is more significant. Justice Crumpacker of the 
Appellate Court of Indiana made the following comments in a 
reversal of a lower court opinion. 
On this testimony the witness was asked to express his 
opinion as to the soundness of mind of Currie Blume on 
the 31st day of January, 1947. The appellee objected 
to the question and upon the objection being sustained 
moved to strike out the entire testimony of the witness 
which motion was also sustained. 
These rulings were made upon the theory that the testi-
mony of the witness concerned matters communicated to 
him as a clergyman as to which he is made an incompetent 
witness by Burnsi Statute Paragraph 2-1714. The statute, 
however, made the witness incompetent only as to "con-
fessions or admissions" made to him "in course of dis-
cipline enjoined by" his church. It is apparent that 
the testimony of Rev. Hofius concerned neither a con-
fession nor an admission on the part of Carrie Blume 
made to him in the course of any disciplinary action 
enjoined upon him by his church. He was clearly a com-
petent witness and it was error to strike out his test-
imony and to refuse to receive his opinion based there-
on as to Carrie Blumels soundness of mind.109  
The case of Sdhaefferis Estate (Pennsylvania, 1941) concurred 
in the opinion that personal observations are not exempt from 
a court of law.110 
There remains the question of possession of the privilege. 
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The legal question divides along the line of reasoning that 
privileges usually must be claimed and do not exist when there 
is no claim to them. The consideration of the clergyman-
privilege poses the question: does the counselee alone have 
the privilege or right to exclude testimony in a court of law 
or does the pastor also have the right to exclude testimony 
even when the counselee wishes that the testimony be given? 
A justice commented on the attorney-client privilege in 
the following manner: 
The privilege of nondisclosure belongs to the client 
alone (Svenson v. Svenson, New York Reports, Vol. 178, 
p. 54) and' disclosure Should not be compelled when a 
clientls liberty is at stake in criminal trial.111 
This opinion has generally been followed in relation to the 
clergyman-privilege. In Gill v. Bouchard (Quebec, 1896)112  
the Quebec court determined the opposite opinion, though. 
This case does not seem to set a precedent. 
1,-,  Cook v. Carrol (Ireland, 194')113  is an important case 
under common law in determing the possession of the privilege. 
Here the justice determined that the privilege resided with 
the priest alone. The justice gave his reasoning. 
As between himself and his attorney, the client is mas-
ter of the situation, so that if he thinks fit to waive 
his privilege, the privilege disappears and the lawyer, 
his paid servant, cannot set it up. But the priest is 
not hired, and a parishioners waiver of privilege should 
not, as a matter of course, destroy the priest=s right 
to keep his secret, where the sacerdotal privilege is 
regulated by law; ...to protect the priest against hav-
ing to testify is only a half-measure of justice, if 
others may blurt out the conversation; the essential 
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foundation of the relation established is the acceptance 
from the outset by all concerned of the inviolable 
secrecy of the meeting under the aegis of the parish 
priest; that is the capital consideration, and we must 
protect confidences which would never have been exchanged 
at all but for the absolute and implicit faith of his 
two parishioners in him. If in a crisis his extra-
ordianary prestige as parish priest is utilized, we can-
not afterwards, having gotten his aid in the closest 
secrecy, treat him as a cipher, a mere onlooker, whose 
determination to have the secret guarded may be ignored 
as soon as one of the contestants seeks to get the bet-
ter of the other by broadcasting it.114 
The Cook v. Carrol is an exception to the rule that the pen-
penitent alone possesses the privilege. 
There is a definite need for the clergyman to have the 
right or possession of the privilege in his own right. This 
was reflected in the opinion of Justice Gavan Duff as quoted 
above. The need is especially evident in marriage counseling. 
Kuhlmann comments on this aspect. 
Either party...should be able to claim the privilege 
even though the other may be willing to waive it. Thus, 
if a husband consult a clergyman with regard to marital 
difficulty and learns from the clergyman certain facts 
which he subsequently would like to introduce into 
evidence in a divorce proceeding, the clergyman should 115 
be in a position to prevent a breach of the confidence. 
There is concrete evidence that the statutes are moving in 
this direction as is evidenced in the California statute pas-
sed in 1965 and ouoted fully in the Appendix. Here is the 
pertinent phrase: 
Subject to Section 912,116 a clergyman, whether or not 
a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose a pen-
itential communication if he claims the privilege. 117 
The Law Revision Commission in California made this comment 
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as regards the new California statute: 
This section provides the clergyman with a privilege 
in his own right. Moreover, he may claim this privi-
lege even if the penitent has waived the privilege 
granted him by Section 1033. 110 
This is only one statute in one state. There remains a great 
need to grant the privilege to the pastor in the fullest sense 
of the term. 
Before this discussion of the clergyman-privilege in the 
fifty states is brought to a conclusion there are two minor 
points of interest. A reading of the statutes as listed in 
the Appendix of this paper reveals two technicalities. First 
certain statutes provide that the clergyman-privilege is 
granted only in civil cases or only in criminal cases. The 
Virginia statute provides: 
No regular minister of religion,...snall be required 
in giving testimony as a witness in any civil action 
to disclose any information communicated to him in a con- 
fidential manner, ...119 
It seems that the Louisiana situation is similar. Kuhlmann 
states in parentheses next to his listing of the Louisiana 
statute that it is "apparently applicable only to criminal 
cases."120 Kuhlmann.s reason for this comment is probably 
that under the clergyman-privilege in Louisiana the statute 
is found only in the Louisiana Criminal Procedures Code121 
and not in the Louisiana Civil Procedures Code. In several 
states the statutes explicitly state that the clergywan-
privilege pertains in both civil and criminal actions. The 
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minister should be aware of the situation in his own statute. 
The California statute reveals a technical point of law 
that should interest the pastor. Under Section 912, entitled, 
"Waiver of Privilege," of the California Evidence Code
122  sub-
section "c" relates: "A disclosure that is itself privileged 
is not a waiver of any ixivilege."123 Thus the person who 
comes to the pastor and relates privileged information ob-
tained in the husband-wife relationship which is privileged 
under law does not waive this husband-wife privilege by re-
vealing to the pastor in confidence the information obatined 
in the marital relationship. Another example of this tech-
nicality is where a physician consults a physician who is a 
specialist and consequently reveals the information derived 
from his patient. This: does.not negate the patients privi-
lege. The pastor is under an obligation to prevent his pa-
rishioner's privilege from being waived by his own actions. 
Thus he should refrain from revealing confidences to those 
whom he consults if at all possible. 
In some cases this is impossible. For instance the 
pastor may see the need to consult a sychiatrist or other 
professional and refer a parishoner to such a person. The 
law does not always protect the clergyman who reveals con-
fidences to other professionals. In this case the clergy-
man is definitedly in an inferior position to the physician 
or lawyer who more often than not finds protection under the 
law in this respect. 
This concludes the discussion of the clergyman-privilege 
under the various state jurisdictions. The conclusions of 
this study of the problem at the state level are incorporated 
with the conclusions at the end of this paper in Chapter Six. 
CHAPTER V 
THE PRIVILEGE IN THE kEDERAL JURISDICTIONS 
The clergyman-privilege under Federal jurisdictions is 
uncertain. There are no Federal statutes concerning the 
privilege. In general the laws and statutes of the various 
states pertain in the Federal jurisdictions. In other words 
the laws of the state in which litigation begins govern the 
Federal courts in their decisions unless the state law con-
tradicts Federal statutes or the Federal Rules of Civil and  
Criminal Procedure.124 Kuhlmann attests to the fact that 
the clergyman-privilege is uncertain in the Federal juris-
dictions: 
The status of the clergyman-privilege in Federal courts 
is uncertain. If it exists at all, it is difficult to 
say how far it extends. There is no Federal statute on 
the matter and the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal  
Procedure do not deal specifically with the subject. 
There are, however, two Federal cases which recognize 
the privilege.125 
The two Federal cases, United States v. Keene 7126  and Mullen 
v. United States,127  will be discussed subsequently. 
First it should be mentioned that there is a statute on 
the clergyman-privilege in the District of Columbia. The 
statute reads as follows: 
An act to prohibit the examination in District of Columbia 
courts of any minister of religion in connection with 
any communication made to him in his professional cap-
acity, without the consent of the party to such communi-
cation. 
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Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives 
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
that no priest, clergyman, rabbi, practitioner of Christian 
Science, or other duly licensed, ordained, or consecrated 
minister of any religion authorized to perform a mar- 
riage ceremony in the District of Columbia shall be ex-
amined in any civil or criminal proceedings in the courts 
of the District of Columbia-- 
(1)with respect to any confession, or communication 
made to him, in his professional capacity in the course 
of discipline enjoined by the church or other religious 
body to which he belongs, without the consent of the 
person making such confession or communications, or 
(2) with respect to any communication made to him, in 
his professional capacity in the course of giving re-
ligious or spiritual advice, without the consent of the 
person seeking such advice, or 
(3) with respect to any communication made to him, in 
his professional capacity, by either spouse, in con-
nection with any effort to reconcile estranged spouses, 
without tip consent of the spouse making the cammuni-
cation.120  
This provision is more extensive than most of the state 
statutes. It recognizes marriage counseling as a bona fide 
spiritual relationship between pastor and counselee. The 
statute seems to allow more room for a liberal construction 
than do most state statutes. 
Although Congress has seen fit to pass the statute on 
clergyman-privilege for the District of Columbia, it has 
failed to pass a Federal statute on the matter. On February 
6, 1959, Senator Kenneth B. Keating introduced Senate bill 
965 which would have granted such a privilege to clergymen 
in the Federal courts or before committees of Congress. He 
sought to amend Chapter 119 of Title 28, of the United States 
Code, by inseritng immediately following Section 1825 the 
following new section entitled 1826: 
1826. Privilege of clergymen and news reporters. 
(1) A clergyman, or other minister of any religion, 
shall not be allowed in any court of the United States 
to disclose a confession made to him, in his profes-
sional character, in the course of discipline enjoined 
by the rules or practice of the religious body to which 
he belongs. 
(2) A person emaged or employed in the work of gather-
ing, compiling, editing, publishing, disseminating, 
broadcasting or televising news shall not be required 
in any court of the United States to disclose the 
source of information procured by him for such pub-
lication, broadcasting or televising unless such dis-
closure is necessary in the interest of national secur-
ity.129 
The bill died in committee. Two other bills were introduced 
in the House of Representatives by Representative Multer of 
New York on January 27, 1959, but they too died in committee. 
Not only has Congress sought action on the clergyman-
privilege on the Federal level, but also the United Nations 
has seen the need for such a privilege. The United Nations 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities under the chairmanship of Arcot Krishnaswami 
recently compiled a "Study of Discrimination in the Matter 
of Religious Rights and Practices." This study produced 
sixteen rules for dealing with problems involved in this 
area. Rule fifteen of the study makes the following state-
ment: 
No cleric who receives information in confidence, in 
accordance with the prescriptions of his religion, 
should be compelled by public authorities to divulge 
such information.130 
Before the discussion of the two important Federal cases 
is undertaken something should be explained more fully at 
this point. The Federal courts generally follow the state 
statutes in which the Federal court sits. Also the con-
struction of the state statute in the state court is usually 
binding in a Federal court. This rule of practice is found 
in volume fifty-eight of American Jurisprudence under par-
agraph 364: 
In a civil action in the Federal court, the statutes 
of the state in which the court sits determine the 
admissibility of evidence which is objected to as be-
ing privileged communication. The construction of the 
statute in the state court is likewise binding on the 
Federal court. 
As to criminal cases, the privileges of witnesses are 
governed by the principles of the common law unless 
provided otherwise by act of Congress or the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.1i1  
It is appropiate at this point to discuss the two 
Federal cases mentioned earlier. Mullen v. United States
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is of particular interest. This case involved confessions 
made to a Lutheran minister by a woman who was not a member 
of the pastor's church. The pastor had promised spiritual 
aid and comfort to the woman if she confessed. 
The woman was Carolyn Mull.en. She was the mother of 
several children. Carolyn Mullen was accustomed to chain-
ing her children in her house while she was absent. The 
woman was tried in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia and was convicted under a Federal 
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statute making it a crime to torture, beat cruelly, abuse, 
or otherwise willfully mistreat a child. The appeal of her 
case was heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit on November 21, 1958. The 
decision which was handed down on December 4, 1958, reversed 
the lower court's conviction. Part of the grounds for re-
versal was that the testimony of the Lutheran pastor was priv-
ileged information. 
One important aspect of this case is that although the 
Federal courts generally follow common law in the absence of 
a statute,133 this Federal court in effect ruled that the 
common law was obsolete. The judge stated in the case: 
...recognition of the privilege in Federal courts does 
not depend upon finding that it has either existed 
uniformly at common laF or has been approved in terms 
by acts of Congress.134 
At another point in Judge Fahyis opinion he states the fol-
lowing principle: 
It thus appears that non-recognition of the privilege 
at certain periods in the development of the common 
law was inconsistent with the basic principles of the 
common law itself. It would be no service to the com-
mon law to perpetuate in its name a rule of evidence 
which is inconsistent with the foregoing fundamental 
guides furnished by that law. And...the denial was 
never uniform or resolute, so strong were the claims 
of reason in support of the privilege.135 
Judge Fahy further comments: 
When reason and experience call for recognition of a 
privilege, which has the effect of restricting evidence, 
the dead hand of the common law will not restrain such 
recognition.136 
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This is a Federal case which upheld the clergyman-privilege 
and disregarded the common law rule of no privilege in the 
absence of a statute. Kuhlmann offers this comment upon 
the courts decision: 
Whether other Federal courts will follow this inter-
pretation, whether they will follow it in civil cases, 
and under what circumstances they will recognize the 
privilege, are all unanswerable questions at this 
time.13( 
In any event the case of Mullen v. United States is an his-
toric decision and offers some encouragement that the priv-
ilege may be recognized on the Federal level. 
The other Federal case on the clergyman-privilege is 
United States v. Keeney.138 This was a prosecution of a 
former United Nations employee for contempt of Congress for 
refusing to answer a question while testifying before a 
Senate subcommittee. On the motion for acquittal the District 
Court Justice Holtzoff held that the information which the 
committee sought as to whether anyone in the State Department 
aided her in obtaining employment with the United Nations was 
not privileged even under the rules and regulations of the 
United Nations.139 
Although the case did not involve privileged information 
between a clergyman and a penitent the court did comment on 
the existence of the clergyman-privilege in passing. Judge 
Holtzoff in his opinion stated: 
The subject of privileged communications is within the 
field vf municipal law and is governed by the law of 
the United States and not by any principle of inter-
national law. Under the law of the United States priv-
ileged communications are strictly limited to a few 
well-defined categories, such as communications between 
attorney and client, clergyman and penitent, and physician 
and patient The law does not recognize that commun-
ications between an employer and employee are privileged, 
even though there may be a moral duty not to disclose 
such communication except when ordered by a competent 
tribunal.140  
Kuhlmann makes this comment on the judgels opinion: 
It would be interesting to know how the court reached 
this unqualified and positive conclusion--but no author-
ity is cited and no reasons are given.141  
This concludes the discussion of the clergyman-privilege 
at the Federal level. The conclusions of this study at the 
Federal level will be drawn in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
It has been shown that the clergyman-privilege in the 
various jurisdictions of this nation is not as well estab-
lished as many clergyman may suppose it to be. The Federal 
courts have made few comments upon the privilege and their 
is no Federal statute to guide their decisions. It seems 
that the privilege at the Federal level of jurisdiction is 
at least questionable. Mullen v. United States is the case 
which may offer the most encouragement to the clergyman, 
but the ruling of the court in this case is an exception to 
the rule. Thus it is doubtful whether Federal courts in the 
future will follow the Mullen case as a precedent. 
The states which do have statutes on the books concern-
ing the privilege often do not offer the protection which 
clergymen deserve in the types of counseling which they 
undertake. The cases which have been decided in the vari-
ous jurisdictions have more often than not denied the priv-
ilege and construed the statutes strictly. It seems that 
the privilege under state jurisdictions offers more hope 
than at the FedeOal level, but the clergyman.s position in 
the various states is by no means absolutely secure. The 
states which have enacted the stronger type of statute on 
the clergyman-privilege offer the most protection to the 
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pastor. In these states which have the stronger or broadened 
type of statute marriage counseling is sometimes considered 
a valid relationship in which confidences may be considered 
privileged under the law. Certain states have provided that 
the pastor may possess the privilege as well as the counselee. 
The California statute which is listed in the Appendix of this 
paper on page sixty is an example of this type of statute. 
The privilege in the states which have the narrow statute. 
is much less secure. The court decisions in these states have 
left little hope for a positive statement on the privilege in 
these states. New statutes are definitedly needed in these 
states. 
There seems to be no logical basis upon which the courts 
have decided cases concerning the clergyman-privilege. The 
decisions have often been inconsistent from one jurisdiction 
to another. Killhmann makes the following comment: 
Unfortunately, the cases form no pattern and offer no 
constructive guidelines for the clergyman. The courts 
decision on the issue of privilege often seems to depend 
more on the result the court wants to reach on the sub-
stantive issue in the case than on a logical applica-
tion of the clergyman-privilege statute. One gets the 
impression which cannot, however, be documented, that 
where the court wants to reach a result that can best 
be attained by exclusion of the clergyman.s testimony 
it has interpreted the statute strictly; whereas, in 
cases where the clergyman.s testimony is needed to reach 
or fortify the desired result on the substantive issue, 
the court has not hesitated to construe the statute 
liberally. There is little rhyme or reason to the 
cases. On the contrary, a view of the cases demonstrate 
how uncertain and unpredictable the clergyman.s position 
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In this light it behooves the minister to take pre-
cautions in his counseling situations. Denominations should 
pass resolutions making it clear that their pastors are under 
a church discipline to hear confessions and other communi-
cations relating to spiritual aid and comfort. Clergy should 
make certain that counseling is conducted in a confidential 
atomosphere. The pastor should have the counselee sign a 
statement that the clergyman will not be called upon to test-
ify in court to information gained in the counseling session. 
Clergy should warn the counselee that the conversation may not 
be privileged. The pastor should know his own state statute.143  
The pastor should not be hampered in the performance of 
his spiritual functions. Judge Fahy in Mullen v. United  
States correctly stated the principle involved: 
Sound policy—reason and experience--concedes to reli-
gious liberty a rule of evidence that a clergyman shall 
not disclose on a trial the secret of a penitent's con-
fidential confession to him, at least absent of the 
penitential's consent. Knowledge so acquired in the 
performance of a spiritual function as indicated in this 
case is not to be transformed into evidence to be given 
to the whole world....The rules of evidence have always 
been concerned not only lyy with truth but with the manner 
of its ascertainment.1 
To this end, namely, the spiritual well-being of counselees, 
the clergyman-privilege should be broadened and enacted more 
firmly into statute law. This paper has sought to reveal 
this need for stronger statutes which clergyman have often 
not realized or neglected. 
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APPENDIX 
Below are listed the state statutes concerning the 
clergyman-privilege. They are listed in alphabetical order. 
The District of Columbia statute is included. 
ALASKA. Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(b), Section 
3. 
A priest or clergyman shall not, without the consent 
of the person making the confession, be examined as to 
any confession made to him in his professional capacity, 
in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to 
which he belongs. 
ARIZONA. Arizona Revised Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 12-
2233. 
In a civil action a clergyman or priest shall not, 
without the consent of the person making a confession, 
be examined as to any confession made to hhn in his 
character as clergyman or priest in the course of 
discipline enjoined by the church to which he belongs. 
IliVi;411WOMAIMA, Arizona Revised Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 13- 
1802. 
A person shall not be examined as a witness in the 
following cases: 
(Li.) A clergyman or priest, without consent of the person 
making the confession, as to any confession made to him 
in his professional character in the course of discipline 
enjoined by the church to which he belongs. 
ARKANSAS. Arkansas Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 28-606. 
No minister of the gospel or priest of any denomination 
shall be compelled to testify in relation to any con-
fession made to him in his professional character, in 
the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or 
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practice of such denomination. 
CALIFORNIA. California Codes, Annotated, Paragraphs 1030- 
1034. 
Paragraph 1030. "Clergyman". 
As used in this article, "clergyman" means a priest, 
minister, religious practitioner, or similar functionary 
of a church or of a religious denomination or religious 
organization. 
Paragraph 1031. "Penitent". 
As used in this article, "penitent" means a person who 
has made a penitential communication to a clergyman. 
Paragraph 1032. "Penitential Communication". 
As used in this article, "penitential communication" 
means a communication made in confidence, in the 
presence of no third person so far as the penitent is 
aware, to a clergyman who, in the course of the dis-
cipline or practice of his church, denomination, or 
organization, is authorized or accustomed to hear such 
communications, and, under the discipline or tenets of 
his church, denomination, or organization has a duty 
to keep such communications secret. 
Paragraph 1033. "Privilege of Penitent". 
Subject to Section 912, a penitent, whether or not a 
party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to 
prevent another from disclosing, a penitential com-
munication if he claims the privilege. 
Paragraph 1034. "Privilege of Clergyman". 
Subject to Section 912, a clergyman, whether or not a 
party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose a peni-
tential communication if he claims the privilege. 
. California Codes, Annotated, Paragraph 912. 
Paragraph 912. "Waiver of privilege". 
(A.) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the 
right of any person to claim a privilege provided by... 
Paragraph 1033 (privilege of penitent), and Paragraph 
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1034 (privilege of clergyman) is waived with respect 
to a communication protected by such privilege if 
holder of the privilege, without coercion, has dis-
closed a significant part of the communication or has 
consented to such disclosure made by anyone. Consent 
to disclosure is manifested by any statement or other 
conduct of the holder of the privilege indicating his 
consent to the disclosure, including his failure to 
claim the privilege in any proceeding in which he has 
legal standing and opportunity to claim the privilege. 
COLORADO. Colorado Revised Statutes, Annotated, Chapter 1%-
1-7(4). 
(4). A clergyman or priest shall not be examined 
without the consent of the person making the confession 
as to any confession made to him in his professional 
character in the course of discipline enjoined by the 
church to which he belongs. 
DELAWARE. Delaware Codes, Annotated, Title 10, Paragraph 4317. 
No priest, clergyman, rabbi, "practitioner of Christian 
Science", or other duly licensed, ordained, or con-
secrated minister of any religion shall be examined in 
any civil or criminal proceedings in the courts of this 
state-- 
(1) with respect to any confession, or communication, 
made to him, in his professional capacity in the course 
of discipline enjoined by the church or other religious 
body to which he belongs, without the consent of the 
person making such confession or communication, 
(2) with respect to any communication made to him, in 
his professional capacity in the course of giving 
religious or spiritual advice, without the consent of 
the person seeking such advice, or 
(3) with respect to any communication made to him, in 
his professional capacity, by either spouse in connec-
tion with any effort to reconcile estranged spouses, 
without the consent of the spouse making the communica-
tion. 
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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. District of Columbia Codes, Annotated, 
Paragraph 14-309. 
An act to prohibit the examination in District of 
Columbia courts of any minister of religion in con-
nection with any communication made to him in his 
professional capacity, without the consent of the 
party to such communication. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives 
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
that no priest, clergyman, rabbi, practitioner of 
Christian Science, or other duly licensed, ordained, or 
consecrated minister of any religion authorized to per- 
form a marriage ceremony in the District of Columbia 
shall be examined in any civil or criminal proceedings 
in the courts of the District of Columbia-- 
t1) with respect to any confession, or communication, 
made to him, in his professional capacity in the course 
of discipline enjoined by the church or other religious 
body to which he belongs, without the consent of the 
person making such confession or communications, or 
(2) with respect to any communication made to him, in 
his professional capacity in the course of giving reli-
gious or spiritual advice, without the consent of the 
person seeking such advice, or 
(3) with respect to any communication made to him, in 
his professional capacity, by either spouse, in con-
nection with any effort to reconcile estranged spouses, 
without the consent of the spouse making the communica-
tion. 
FLORIDA. Florida Statutes Annotated, Paragraph 90.2111. 
(1) No minister of the gospel, no priest of the Catholic 
church, no rector of the Episcopal church, no ordained 
rabbi, no practitioner of Christian Science, and no 
regular minister of religion of any religious organiza-
tion or denomination usually referred to as a church, 
over the age of twenty-one years, shall be allowed or 
required in giving testimony as a witness in any lit-
igation, to disclose any information communicated to 
him in his professional capacity, and necessary to en-
able him to discharge the functions of his office ac- 
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cording to the usual course of his practice or disci-
pline, wherein such person so communication such in-
formation about himself or another is seeking spiritual 
counsel and advice relative to and growing out of the 
information so imparted. 
(2) Such prohibition shall not apply to cases where the 
communicating party, or parties, waives the right so 
conferred by personal appearance in open court so de-
claring, or by affidavit properly sworn to by such a 
one, or ones, before some person authorized to admin-
ister oaths, and filed with the court wherein litiga-
tion is pending. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall modify or in anywise 
change the law relative to "hearsay testimony". 
(Ii) It shall be the duty of the judge of the court 
wherein such litigation is pending, when such testi-
mony as herein prohibited is offered, to determine 
whether or not that person possesses the qualifications 
which prohibit him from testifying to the communica-
tions sought to be proved by him. 
GEORGIA. Code of Georgia, Annotated, Paragraph 38-419.1. 
Every communication made by any person professing 
religious faith, or seeking spiritual comfort, to any 
Protestant minister of the Gospel, or to any priest 
of the Roman Catholic faith, or to any Christian or 
Jewish minister, by whatever name called, shall be 
deemed privileged. No such minister, priest, or rabbi 
shall disclose any communications made to him by any 
such person professing religious faith, or seeking 
spiritual guidance, or be competent or compellable to 
testify with reference to any such communication in 
any court. 
HAWAII. Hawaii Revised Statutes, Paragraph 621-20. 
No clergyman of any church or religious denomination 
shall, without the consent of the person making the 
confession, divulge in any action, suit, or proceeding, 
whether civil or criminal, any confession made to him 
in his professional character according to the uses of 
the church or religious denomination to which he belongs. 
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IDAHO. Idaho Codes, Annotated, Paragraph 9-203 (3). 
A clergyman or priest aan not, without the consent of 
the person making the confession, be examined as to 
any confession made to him in his professional char-
acter in the course of discipline enjoined by the 
church to which he belongs. 
ILLINOIS. Illinois Revised Statutes, Annotated, Chapter 51, 
Paragraph 10.1. 
A clergyman, or priest, minister, rabbi or practitioner 
of any religious denomination accredited by the religious 
body to which he belongs, shall not be compelled to dis-
close in any court, or to any administrative board or 
agency, or to any public officer, a confession or ad-
mission made to him in his professional character or as 
a spiritual adviser in the course of the discipline en-
joined by the rules or practices of such religious body 
or of the religion which he professes, nor be compelled 
to divulge any information which he obtained by him in 
such professional character or as such spiritual adviser. 
INDIANA. Indiana Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 2-1714. 
The following persons shall not be competent witnesses: 
Fifth. Clergymen, as to confessions or admissions made 
to them in course of discipline enjoined by their re-
spective churches. 
IOWA. Iowa Code, Annotated, paragraph 622.10. 
No practicing attorney, counselor, physician, surgeon, 
or the stenographer or confidential clerk of any such 
person, who obtains such information by reason of his 
employment, minister of the gospel or priest of any 
denomination shall be allowed, in giving testimony, to 
disclose any confidential communication properly en-
trusted to him in his professional capacity, and nec-
essary and groper to enable him to discharge the func-
tions of his uffice according to the usual course of 
practice or discipline. Such prohibition shall not 
apply to cases where the person in whose favor the 
same is made waives the rights conferred... 
(Last part refers to a physician in a civil suit.) 
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KANSAS. Kansas Civil Procedures Statutes, Annotated, Para-
graph 60-429. 
(A.) Definitions. As used in this section, 
(1) the term "duly ordained minister of religion, means 
a person who has been ordained, in accordance with the 
ceremonial ritual, or dsicipline of a church, religious 
sect, or organization established on the basis of a 
community of faith and belief, doctrines and practices 
of a religious character, to preach and to teach the 
doctrines of such church, sect, or organization and to 
administer the rites and ceremonies thereof in public 
worship, and who as his regular and customary vocation 
preaches and teaches the principles of religion and 
administers the ordinances of public worship as embodied 
in the creed or principles of such church, sect, or 
organization; 
t2) the term "regular minister of religion" means one 
who as his customary vocation preaches and teaches the 
principles of religion of a church, a religious sect, or 
organization of which he is a member, without having been 
formally ordained as a minister of religion, and who is 
recognized by such church, sect, or organization as a 
regular minister; 
k3) the term "regular or duly ordained minister of 
religion" does not include a person who irregularly or 
incidentally preaches and teaches the principles of 
religion of a church, religious sect, or organization 
and does not include any person who may have been duly 
ordained a minister in accordance with the ceremonial, 
rite, or discipline of a church, religious sect or or-
ganization, but who does not regularly, as a vocation, 
teach and preach the principles of religion and admin-
ister the ordinances of public worship as embodied in 
the creed or principles of his church, sect, or organ-
ization; 
(Lb) "penitent" means a person who recognizes the ex-
istence and the authority of God and who seeks or re-
ceives from a regular or duly ordained minister of 
religion advice or assistance in determining or dis-
charging his moral obligations, or in obtaining God's 
mercy or forgiveness for past culpable conduct; 
(5) "penitential communication" means any communica-
tion between a penitent and a regular or duly ordained 
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minister of religion which the penitent intends shall 
be kept secret and confidential and which pertains to 
advice or assistance in determining or discharging the 
penitent's moral obligations, or to obtaining Godis 
mercy or rorgiveness for past culpable conduct. 
(B.) Privilege. A person, whether or not a party, has 
a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent a 
witness from disclosing a communication if he claims 
the privilege and the judge finds that 
(1) the communication was a penitential communication and 
(2) the witness is the penitent or the minister, and 
(3) the claimant is the penitent, or the minister making 
claim on behalf of an absent penitent. 
KENTUCKY. Kentucky Revised Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 
421.210 (4). 
(4) nor shall a clergyman or priest testify concerning 
any confession made to him, in his professional character, 
in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to 
which he belongs, without the consent of the person con-
fessing. 
LOUISIANA. Louisiana Criminal Procedures Code, Annotated, 
Paragraph 15.477. 
Paragraph 15-47?. Privileged communications to clergymen. 
No clergyman is permitted, without the consent of the 
person making the communication, to disclose any com-
munication made to him in confidence by one seeking his 
spiritual advice or consolation, or any information that 
he may have gotten by reason of such communication. 
W411,04wrim, Louisiana Criminal Procedures Code, Annotated, 
Paragraph 15-478. 
Paragraph 15-478. Right to exclude testimony; nature of  
privilege; waiver. 
The right to exclude the testimony, as provided in the 
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three articles last preceding, is purely personal, and 
can be set up only by the person in whose favor the right 
exists. If the right is waived, the legal adviser, the 
physician and the clergyman, as the case may be, may be 
examined and cross-examined to the same extent as any 
other witness. 
MAINE. Maine Revised Statutes, Title 16, Paragraph 57. 
Paragraph 57. "Privileged communications; clergymen". 
(A.) Definitions. "Clergyman" means a priest, rabbi, 
clergyman, minister of the gospel or other officer of 
a church or of a religious denomination or organization 
who in the course of its discipline or practice is 
authorized or accustomed to hear, and has a duty to 
keep secret, penitential communications made by members 
of his church, denomination or organization; 
(2) "genitent" means a member of a church or religious 
denomination or organization who has made a penitential 
communication to a clergyman thereof; 
(3) "Penitential communication" means a confession of 
culpable conduct made secretly and in confidence by a 
penitent to a clergyman in the course of the discipline 
or practice of the church or religious denomination or 
organization of which the penitent is a member. 
(B.) Privilege. A person, whether or not a party, has 
a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent a 
witness from disclosing, a communication if he claims 
the privilege and the judge finds that the communica-
tion was a penitential communication and the witness 
is the penitent or the clrgyman, and the claimant is 
the penitent or the clergyman, making the claim on 
behalf of an absent penitent. 
MARYLAND. Maryland Annotated Code, Article 35, Paragraph 13. 
No minister of the Gospel, clergyman or priest of an 
established church, of any denomination, shall be com-
pelled to testify in relation to any confession or com-
munication made to him in confidence by one seeking his 
spiritual advice or consolation. 
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MASSACHUSETTS. Massachusetts Annotated Laws, Chapter 233, 
Paragraph 20A. 
Paragraph 20A. "Certain Communications to Priests, 
Rabbis, Ministers, and Christian Science Practitioners 
Shall Be Privileged." 
A priest, rabbi, or ordained or licensed minister of 
any church or an accredited Christian Science prac-
titioner shall not, without the consent of the person 
making the confession, be allowed to disclose a con-
fession made to him in his professional character, in 
the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or 
practice of the religious body to which he belongs; 
nore shall a priest, rabbi or ordained or licensed 
minister of any church or an accredited Christian 
Science practitioner testify as to any communication 
made to him by any person in seeking religious or 
spiritual advice or comfort, or as to his advice given 
thereon in the course of his professional duties or in 
his professional character, without the consent of such 
person. 
MICHIGAN. Michigan Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 27A. 2156. 
No minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomina-
tion whatsoever, or duly accredited Christian Science 
practitioner, shall be allowed to disclose any con-
fessions made to him in his professional character, in 
the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or prac-
tice of such denomination. 
MINNESOTA. Minnesota Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 595.02(3). 
(3) A clergyman or other minister of any religion shall 
not, without the consent of the party making the con-
fession, be allowed to disclose a confession made to him 
in his professional character, in the course of disci-
pline enjoined by the rules or practice of the religious 
body to which he belongs; nor shall a clergyman or other 
minister of any religion be examined as to any communica-
tion made to him by any person seeking religious or spir-
itual advice, aid, or comfort or his advice given thereon 
in the course of his professional character, without the 
consent of such person. 
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MISSOURI. Missouri Revised Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 
491.060t4).  
Paragraph 491.060. The following persons shall be in-
competent to testify: 
(14.) A minister of the gospel or priest of any denomina-
tion, concerning a confession made to him in his pro-
fessional character, in the course of discipline en-
joined by the rules of practice of such denomination. 
MONTANA. Revised Codes of Montana, Paragraph 93-701-4. 
(3) A clergyman or priest cannot,: without the consent 
of the person making the confession, be examined as to 
any confession made to him in his professional char-
acter in the course of discipline enjoined by the 
church to Which he belongs. 
irmft11.01,00 Revised Codes of Montana, Paragraph 94-8801. 
The rules for determining the competency of witnesses 
in civil actions are applicable also to criminal actions 
and proceedings, except as otherwise provided in this 
code. 
NEBRASKA. Nebraska Revised Statutes, Paragraph 25-1201. 
Paragraph 25-1201. "Witnesses; incompetent, when." 
Every human being of sufficient capacity to under-
stand the obligation of an oath is a competent wit-
ness in all cases, civil and criminal, except as 
otherwise herein declared. The following persons 
shall be incompetent to testify: 
(4) a clergyman or priest, concerning any confession 
made to him in his professional character in the course 
of discipline enjoined by the church to Which he belongs, 
without the consent of the person making the confession. 
Nebraska Revised Statutes,  Paragraph 25-1206. 
Paragraph 25-1206. "Witnesses; other privileged re-
lations; communications; competency." 
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No practicing attorney, counselor, physician, surgeon, 
minister of the gospel or priest of any denomination, 
shall be allowed in giving testimony to disclose any 
confidential communication, properly entrusted to him 
in his professional capacity, and necessary and proper 
to enable him to discharge the functions of his office 
according to the usual course of practice or discipline. 
NEVADA. Nevada Revised Statutes, Paragraph 48.070. 
Paragraph 48.070. "Confessor and confessant relation-
ship." 
A clergyman or priest shall not, without the consent 
of the person making the confession, be examined as a 
witness as to any confession made to him in his pro 
fessional character. 
NEW JERSEY. New Jersey Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 
2A: 84A*23. 
2A: o4A-23. "Priest-penitent privilege. Rule 29." 
Subject to Rule 37, a clergyman, minister or other 
person or practitioner authorized to perform similar 
functions, of any religion shall not be allowed or 
compelled to disclose a confession or other confi-
dential communication made to him in his professional 
character, or as a spiritual advisor in the course of 
the discipline or practice of the religious body to 
which he belongs or of the religion which he pro-
fesses. 
 New Jerse; Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 2A: 84A-29, 
Rule 37. 
Paragraph 2A: 84A-29, Rule 37. "Waiver of privilege by 
contract or previous disclosure; limitations. 
A person waives his right or privilege to refuse to 
disclose or to prevent another from disclosing a spec-
ified matter if he or any other person while the holder 
thereof has (a) contracted with anyone not to claim the 
right or privilege or, (b) without coercion and with 
knowledge of his right or privilege, made disclosure of 
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any part of the privileged matter or consented to such 
a disclosure made by anyone. 
A disclosure which is itself privileged or otherwise 
protected by the common law, statutes or rules of court 
of this State, or by lawful contract, shall not con-
stitute a waiver under this section. The failure of a 
witness to claim a right or privilege with respect to 
the first question shall not operate as a waiver with 
respect to any other question. 
NEW MEXICO. New Mexico Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 20-1-12. 
Paragraph 20-1.12. "Privileged communications." 
(c) A clergyman cannot, without the consent of the per-
son making the confessieno rbeJexathined as .to .ny- O=4: 
Passion or disclosure made to him in his professional 
character. 
(P) If a person offer himself as a witness and volun-
tarily testify with reference to the communications 
specified in this act, that is to be deemed a consent 
to the examination of the person to whom the communi-
cations were made as above provided. 
NEW YORK. New York Civil Practice Law, raragraph 4.505. 
Paragraph 4505. "Confidential communication to clergy 
privileged." 
tin less the person confessing or confiding waives the 
privilege, a clergyman, or other minister of any reli-
gion or duly accredited Christian Science practitioner, 
shall not be allowed to disclose a confession or con-
fidence made to him in his professional character as 
spiritual advisor. 
NORTH CAROLINA. North Carolina General Statutes, raragraph 
0-53.1. 
Paragraph 1.53.1. "Communications between clergymen and 
communicants." 
No priest, rabbi, accredited Christian Science prac-
titioner, Qr a clergyman or ordained minister of an 
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established church shall be competent to testify in any 
action, suit or proceeding concerning any information 
which was communicated to him and entrusted to him in 
his professional capacity, and necessary to enable him 
to discharge the functions of his office according to 
the usual course of his practice or discipline, wherein 
such person so communicating such information about him-
self or another is seeking spiritual counsel and advice 
relative to and growing out of the information so im-
parted provided, however, that this section shall not 
apply where communicant in open court waives the priv-
ilege conferred. 
NORTH DAKOTA. North Dakota Century Code, paragraph 31-01-06. 
Paragraph 31-ul-u6. "Attorneys, clergyman, priests, 
physicians, surgeons, and public officers cannot test-
ify regarding confidential communications." 
A person cannot be examined as a witness in the fol-
lowing cases: 
(2),  A clergyman or priest, without the consent of the 
person making the confession, cannot be examined as to 
any confession made to him in his professional char-
acter in the course of discipline enjoined by the church 
to which he belongs. 
OHIO. Ohio Revised Codes, Annotated, Paragraph 2317.02. 
Paragraph 2317.02. The following person shall not 
testify in certain respects: 
(B) A clergyman or priest, concerning a confession 
made to him in his professional character in the 
course of discipline enjoined by the church to which 
he belongs. 
OKLAHOMA. Oklahoma Statutes, Annotated, Title 12, Paragraph 
385. 
Paragraph 3o5. "Persons incompetent to testify enumerated." 
The following persons shall be incompetent to testify: 
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(5.) A clergyman or priest, concerning any confession 
made to him in his professional character in the course 
of discipline enjoined by the church to which he belongs, 
without the consent of the person making the confession. 
OREGON. Oregon Revised Statutes, Paragraph 44.040. 
Paragraph 44.040. "Confidential Communications". 
(C) A priest or clergyman shall not, without the con-
sent of the person making the confession, be examined 
as to any confession made to him in his professional 
character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the 
church to which he belongs. 
PENNSYLVANIA. Pennsylvania Statutes, Annotated, Title 28, 
Paragraph 331. 
Paragraph 331. "Confiential Communications to Clergymen." 
No clergyman, priest, rabbi or minister of the gospel 
of any regularly established church or religious organ-
ization, except clergymen or ministers, who are self-
ordained or who are members of religious organizations 
in which members other than the leader thereof are 
deemed clergymen or ministers, who while in the course 
of his duties has acquired information from any person 
secretly and in confidence shall not be compelled, or 
allowed without consent of such person, to disclose 
that information in any legal proceeding, trial or in-
vestigation before any grand jury, traverse or petit 
jury, or any officer thereof, before the General Assembly 
or any committee thereof, or before any commission, 
department or bureau of this Commonwealth, or municipal 
body, officer or committee thereof. 
RHODE ISLAND. General Laws of Rhode Island, Annotated, 
Paragraph 9-17-23. 
raragraph 9-17-23. "Privileged Communications to clergymen." 
In the trial of every cause, both civil and criminal, 
no clergyman or priest shall be competent to testify 
concerning any confession made to him in his professional 
character in the course of discipline enjoined by the 
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church to which he belongs, without the consent of the 
person making the confession. No duly ordained min-
ister of the gospel, priest or rabbi of any denomina-
tion shall be allowed in giving testimony to disclose 
any confidential communication, properly entrusted to 
him in his professional capacity, and necessary and 
proper to enable him to discharge the functions of his 
office in the usual course of practice or discipline, 
without the consent of the person making such commun-
ication. 
SOUTH CAROLINA. Code of Laws of South Carolina, Annotated, 
Paragraph 26-409. 
Paragraph 26-409. "Ministers priests, and rabbis not 
required to disclose confidential communications." 
In any legal or quasi-legal trial, hearing or pro-
ceeding before any court, commission or committee no 
regular or duly ordained minister, priest or rabbi 
shall be required, in giving testimony, to disclose 
any confidential communication properly entrusted to 
him in his professional capacity and necessary and 
proper to enable him to discharge the functions of his 
office according to the usual course of practice or 
discipline of his church or religious body. This pro-
hibition shall not apply to cases where the party in 
whose favor it is made waives the rights conferred. 
SOUTH DAKOTA. South Dakota Compiled Laws, 1961, Annotated, 
Paragraph ly-2-2. 
A clergyman or priest cannot, without the consent of 
the person making the confession, be examined as to 
any confession made to him in his professions.; char-
acter in the course of discipline enjoined in the 
church to which he belongs. 
TENNESSEE. Tennessee Codes, Annotated, Paragraph 24-109. 
Paragraph 24-109. "Clergymen--Communications 
Confidential--Testimony prohibited--Waiver" 
No minister of the gospel, no priest of the Catholic 
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Church, no rector of the Episcopal Church, no ordained 
rabbi, and no regular minister of religion of any re-
ligious organization or denomination usually referred 
to as a church, over the age of twenty-one years, shall 
be allowed or required in giving testimony as a witness 
in any litigation, to disclose any information com-
municated to him in a confidentail manner, properly 
entrusted to him in his professional capacity, and nec-
essary to enable him to discharge the functions of his 
office according to the usual course of his practice or 
discipline, wherein such person so communicating such 
information about himself or another is seeking spir-
itual counsel and advice relative to and growing out of 
the information so imparted. 
Such prohibition shall not apply to cases where the 
communicating party, or parties, waives the right so 
conferred by personal appearance in open court so de-
claring, or by an affidavit properly sworn to by such 
a one or ones, before some person authorized to admin-
ister oaths, and filed with the court wherein litiga-
tion is pending. Nothing in this section shall modify 
or in anywise change the law relative to "hearsay 
testimony." 
. Tennessee Codes, Annotated, Paragraph 24-110. 
Paragraph 24-110. "Penalty when clergyman testifies 
contrary to preceding section." 
Any minister of the gospel, priest of the Catholic 
Church, rector of the Episcopal Church, ordained rabbi, 
and any regular minister of religion of any religious 
organization or denomination usually referred to as a 
church, violating the provisions of Paragraph 24-109, 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined not less 
than fifty dollars ($50.00) and imprisoned in the 
county jail or workhouse not exceeding six (6) months. 
UTAH. Utah Code, Annotated, Paragraph 78-24-8(3). 
Paragraph 78-2L.-8. "Privileged Communications." 
(3) A clergyman or priest cannot, without the consent 
of the person making the confession, be examined as to 
any confession made to him in his professional char-
acter in the course of discipline enjoined by the church 
to which he belongs. 
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VERMONT. Vermont Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 12-1607. 
Paragraph 1607. "Priests and Ministers." 
A priest or minister of the gospel shall not be per-
mitted to testify in court to statements made to him 
by a person under the sanctity of a religious confes-
sional. 
VIRGINIA. Virginia Code, Annotated, Paragraph 8-289.2. 
Paragraph 8-289.2. "Communications between ministers 
of religion and persons they counsel or advise." 
No regular minister of religion, over the age of twenty-
one years, of any religious organization or denomina-
tion usually referred to as a church, shall be required 
in giving testimony as a witness in any civil action to 
disclose any information communicated to him in a con-
fidential manner, properly entrusted to him in his pro-
fessional capacity and necessary to enable him to dis-
charge the functions of his office according to the 
usual course of his practice or discipline, wherein 
such person so communicating such information about him-
self or another is seeking spiritual counsel and advise 
relative to and growing out of the information so im-
parted. 
WASHINGTON. Washington Revised Code, Annotated, Paragraph 
5.60.060. 
Paragraph 5.60.060. "Who are disqualified--Privileged 
Communications." 
(3) A clergyman or priest shall not, without the consent 
of the person making the confession be examined as to 
any confession made to him in his professional character, 
in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to 
which he belongs. 
WEST VIRGINIA. West Virginia Code, Annotated, raragraph 50-610. 
Paragraph 50-610. "Persons Incompetent To Testify." 
The following persons are incompetent to testify as here-
inafter provided, and not otherwise: 
77 
(d) A minister, clergyman or priest of any religious 
denomination, concerning any confession made to him 
according to the course of discipline enjoined by the 
church to which he belongs. 
WISCONSIN. Wisconsin Statutes, Annotated, Paragraph 325.20. 
Paragraph 325.20. "Confessions to Clergymen." 
A clergyman or other minister of any religion shall 
not be allowed to disclose a confession made to him 
in his professional character, in the course of dis-
cipline enjoined by the rules or practice of the re-
ligious body to which he belongs, without consent 
thereto by the party confessing. 
WYOMING. Wyoming Statutes, Annotated. Paragraph 1-139. 
Paragraph 1-139. "Privileged Communication and Acts." 
The following persons shall not testify in certain 
respects: 
(2) A clergyman or priest, concerning a confession 
made to him in his professional character, in the 
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